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Abstract
The promise of secure cryptographic quantum key distribution
schemes is based on the use of quantum effects in the spin space.
We point out that in fact in many current quantum cryptography
protocols the space part of the wave function is neglected. However
exactly the space part of the wave function describes the behaviour
of particles in ordinary real three-dimensional space. As a result such
schemes can be secure against eavesdropping attacks in the abstract
spin space but could be insecure in the real three-dimensional space.
We discuss an approach to the security of quantum key distribution in
space by using Bell’s inequality and a special preparation of the space
part of the wave function.
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1 Introduction
It is now generally accepted that techniques of quantum cryptography can
allow secure communications between distant parties [1] - [14]. The promise
of secure cryptographic quantum key distribution schemes is based on the use
of quantum entanglement in the spin space and on quantum no-cloning the-
orem. An important contribution of quantum cryptography is a mechanism
for detecting eavesdropping.
In the present note we point out that in fact in many current quantum
cryptography protocols the space part of the wave function is neglected.
However exactly the space part of the wave function describes the behaviour
of particles in ordinary real three-dimensional space. As a result such schemes
can be secure against eavesdropping attacks in the abstract spin space but
could be insecure in the real three-dimensional space. We discuss an approach
to the security of quantum key distribution in the real space by using Bell’s
inequality and a special preparation of the space part of the wave function.
Bell’s theorem [15] states that there are quantum correlation functions
that can not be represented as classical correlation functions of separated
random variables. It has been interpreted as incompatibility of the require-
ment of locality with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics [15].
Bell’s theorem constitutes an important part in quantum cryptography pro-
tocols [2].
It was mentioned in [16] that the space dependence of the wave function
is neglected in discussions of the problem of locality in relation to Bell’s
inequalities. However it is the space part of the wave function which is
relevant to the consideration of the problem of locality. Similar remark one
can apply to quantum teleportation [17]. It was shown [16] that the space
part of the wave function leads to an extra factor in quantum correlation and
as a result the ordinary proof of Bell’s theorem fails in this case.
It follows that proofs of the security of quantum cryptography schemes
which neglect the space part of the wave function could fail against attacks in
the real three-dimensional space. We will discuss how one can try to improve
the security of quantum cryptography schemes in space by using a special
preparation of the space part of the wave function.
2
2 Quantum Key Distribution
Ekert [2] showed that one can use the EPR correlations to establish a secret
random key between two parties (”Alice” and ”Bob”). Bell’s inequalities are
used to check the presence of an intermediate eavesdropper (”Eve”). There
are two stages to the Ekert protocol, the first stage over a quantum channel,
the second over a public channel.
The quantum channel consists of a source that emits pairs of spin one-
half particles, in a singlet state. The particles fly apart towards Alice and
Bob, who, after the particles have separated, perform measurements on spin
components along one of three directions, given by unit vectors a and b. In
the second stage Alice and Bob communicate over a public channel.They
announce in public the orientation of the detectors they have chosen for
particular measurements. Then they divide the measurement results into two
separate groups: a first group for which they used different orientation of the
detectors, and a second group for which they used the same orientation of the
detectors. Now Alice and Bob can reveal publicly the results they obtained
but within the first group of measurements only. This allows them, by using
Bell’s inequality, to establish the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The
results of the second group of measurements can be converted into a secret
key.
3 Bell’s Inequality
In the presentation of Bell’s theorem we will follow [16] where one can find
also more references. Consider a pair of spin one-half particles formed in the
singlet spin state and moving freely towards Alice and Bob. If one neglects
the space part of the wave function then the quantum mechanical correlation
of two spins in the singlet state ψspin is
Espin(a, b) = 〈ψspin|σ · a⊗ σ · b|ψspin〉 = −a · b (1)
Here a and b are two unit vectors in three-dimensional space and σ =
(σ1, σ2, σ3) are the Pauli matrices. Bell’s theorem states that the function
Espin(a, b) (1) can not be represented in the form
P (a, b) =
∫
ξ(a, λ)η(b, λ)dρ(λ) (2)
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Here ξ(a, λ) and η(b, λ) are random fields on the sphere, |ξ(a, λ)| ≤ 1,
|η(b, λ)| ≤ 1 and dρ(λ) is a positive probability measure, ∫ dρ(λ) = 1. The
parameters λ are interpreted as hidden variables in a realist theory. One
supposes that Eve is described by these variables.
One has the following Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequal-
ity
|P (a, b)− P (a, b′) + P (a′, b) + P (a′, b′)| ≤ 2 (3)
From the other hand there are such vectors (ab = a′b = a′b′ = −ab′ = √2/2)
for which one has
|Espin(a, b)−Espin(a, b′) + Espin(a′, b) + Espin(a′, b′)| = 2
√
2 (4)
Therefore if one supposes that Espin(a, b) = P (a, b) then one gets the contra-
diction.
4 Localized Detectors
In the previous section the space part of the wave function of the particles
was neglected. However exactly the space part is relevant to the discussion
of locality. The complete wave function is ψ = (ψαβ(r1, r2)) where α and β
are spinor indices and r1 and r2 are vectors in three-dimensional space.
We suppose that Alice and Bob have detectors which are located within
the two localized regions OA and OB respectively, well separated from one
another. Eve has a detector which is located within the region OE . Quantum
correlation describing the measurements of spins by Alice and Bob at their
localized detectors is
E(a,OA, b,OB) = 〈ψ|σ · aPOA ⊗ σ · bPOB |ψ〉 (5)
Here PO is the projection operator onto the region O.
Let us consider the case when the wave function has the form ψ =
ψspinφ(r1, r2). Then one has
E(a,OA, b,OB) = g(OA,OB)Espin(a, b) (6)
where the function
g(OA,OB) =
∫
OA×OB
|φ(r1, r2)|2dr1dr2 (7)
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describes correlation of particles in space. Note that one has
0 ≤ g(OA,OB) ≤ 1 (8)
Remark. In relativistic quantum field theory there is no nonzero strictly
localized projection operator that annihilates the vacuum. It is a conse-
quence of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem [18]. Therefore, apparently, the func-
tion g(OA,OB) should be always strictly smaller than 1. I am grateful to W.
Luecke for this remark.
We will interpret Eve as a hidden variable in a realist theory and will
study whether the quantum correlation (6) can be represented in the form
(2). More exactly one inquires whether one can write the representation
g(OA,OB)Espin(a, b) =
∫
ξ(a,OA, λ)η(b,OB, λ)dρ(λ) (9)
Now from (3), (4) and (9) one can obtain the following inequality
g(OA,OB) ≤ 1/
√
2 (10)
If the inequality (10) is valid for regions OA and OB which are well separated
from one another then there is no violation of the CHSH inequalities (3) and
therefore Alice and Bob can not detect the presence of an eavesdropper.
From the other side, if for a pair of well separated regions OA and OB one
has
g(OA,OB) > 1/
√
2 (11)
then it could be a violation of the realist locality in these regions for a given
state. Then, in principle, one can hope to detect an eavesdropper in these
circumstances.
Note that if we set g(OA,OB) = 1 in (9) as it was done in the original
proof of Bell’s theorem, then it means we did a special preparation of the
states of particles to be completely localized inside of detectors. There exist
such well localized states (see however the previous Remark) but there exist
also another states, with the wave functions which are not very well local-
ized inside the detectors, and still particles in such states are also observed
in detectors. The fact that a particle is observed inside the detector does
not mean, of course, that its wave function is strictly localized inside the
detector before the measurement. Actually one has to perform a thorough
investigation of the preparation and the evolution of our entangled states in
space and time if one needs to estimate the function g(OA,OB).
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5 Conclusions
It is pointed out in this note that the presence of the space part in the
wave function of two particles in the entangled state leads to a problem
in the proof of the security of quantum key distribution. To detect the
eavesdropper’s presence by using Bell’s inequality we have to estimate the
function g(OA,OB). Only a special quantum key distribution protocol has
been discussed here but it seems there are similar problems in other quantum
cryptographic schemes as well.
We don’t claim in this note that it is in principle impossible to increase
the detectability of the eavesdropper. However it is not clear to the present
author how to do it without a thorough investigation of the process of prepa-
ration of the entangled state and then its evolution in space and time towards
Alice and Bob.
In the previous section Eve was interpreted as an abstract hidden variable.
However one can assume that more information about Eve is available. In
particular one can assume that she is located somewhere in space in a region
OE . It seems one has to study a generalization of the function g(OA,OB),
which depends not only on the Alice and Bob locations OA and OB but also
depends on the Eve location OE , and try to find a strategy which leads to
an optimal value of this function.
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